Cox's well-known theorem justifying the use of probability is shown not to hold in nite domains. The counterexample also suggests that Cox's assumptions are insu cient to prove the result even in in nite domains. The same counterexample is used to disprove a result of Fine on comparative conditional probability.
Introduction
One of the best-known and seemingly most compelling justi cations of the use of probability is given by Cox (1946) . Suppose we have a function Bel that associates a real number with each pair (U; V ) of subsets of a domain W such that U 6 = ;. We write Bel(V jU) rather than Bel(U; V ), since we think of Bel(V jU) as the credibility or likelihood of V given U. 1 Cox further assumes that Bel(V jU) is a function of Bel(V jU) (where V denotes the complement of V in W ), that is, there is a function S such that A1. Bel(V jU) = S(Bel(V jU)) if U 6 = ;, and that Bel(V \ V 0 jU) is a function of Bel(V 0 jV \ U) and Bel(V jU), that is, there is a function F such that A2. Bel(V \ V 0 jU) = F (Bel(V 0 jV \ U); Bel(V jU)) if V \ U 6 = ;.
Notice that if Bel is a probability function, then we can take S(x) = 1 x and F (x; y) = xy. Cox makes much weaker assumptions: he assumes that F is twice di erentiable, with a continuous second derivative, and that S is twice di erentiable. Under these assumptions, he shows that Bel is isomorphic to a probability distribution in the sense that there is a continuous one-to-one onto function g : IR ! IR such that g Bel is a probability distribution on W , and g(Bel(V jU)) g(Bel(U)) = g(Bel(V \ U)) if U 6 = ;, (1) where Bel(U) is an abbreviation for Bel(UjW ).
Not surprisingly, Cox's result has attracted a great deal of interest, particularly in the maximum entropy community and, more recently, in the AI community. For example The rst to observe potential problems with Cox's result is Paris (1994) . As he puts it, \Cox's proof is not, perhaps, as rigorous as some pedants might prefer and when an attempt is made to ll in all the details some of the attractiveness of the original is lost." Paris provides a rigorous proof of the result, assuming that the range of Bel is contained in 0; 1] and using assumptions similar to those of Horvitz, Heckerman, and Langlotz. In particular, he assumes that F is continuous and strictly increasing in (0; 1] 2 and that S is decreasing. However, he makes use of one additional assumption that, as he himself says, is not very appealing:
A4. For all 0 ; ; 1 and > 0, there are sets U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4 such that U 3 6 = ;, and each of jBel(U 4 jU 3 ) j, jBel(U 3 jU 2 ) j, and jBel(U 2 jU 1 ) j is less than .
Notice that this assumption forces the range of Bel to be dense in 0; 1]. This means that, in particular, the domain W on which Bel is de ned cannot be nite. Is this assumption really necessary? Paris suggests that Acz el needs something like it. (This issue is discussed in further detail below.) The counterexample of this paper gives further evidence. It shows that Cox's result fails in nite domains, even if we assume that the range of Bel is in 0; 1], S(x) = 1 x (so that, in particular, S is twice di erentiable and monotonically decreasing), G(x; y) = x + y, and F is in nitely di erentiable and strictly increasing on (0; 1] 2 . We can further assume that F is commutative, F (0; x) = F (x; 0) = 0, and that F (x; 1) = F (1; x) = x. The example emphasizes the point that the applicability of Cox's result is far narrower than was previously believed. It remains an open question as to whether there is an appropriate strengthening of the assumptions that does give us Cox's result in nite settings. There is further discussion of this issue in Section 5.
In fact, the example shows even more. In the course of his proof, Cox claims to show that F must be an associative function, that is, that F (x; F (y; z)) = F (F (x; y); z). For the Bel of the counterexample, there can be no associative function F satisfying A2. It is this observation that is the key to showing that there is no probability distribution isomorphic to Bel.
What is going on here? Actually, Cox's proof just shows that F (x; F (y; z)) = F (F (x; y); z) only for those triples (x; y; z) such that, for some sets U 1 , U 2 , U 3 , and U 4 , we have x = Bel(U 4 jU 3 \ U 2 \ U 1 ), y = Bel(U 3 jU 2 \ U 1 ), and z = Bel(U 2 jU 1 ). If the set of such triples (x; y; z) is dense in 0; 1] 3 , then we conclude by continuity that F is associative. The content of A4 is precisely that the set of such triples is dense in 0; 1] 3 . Of course, if W is nite, we cannot have density. As my counterexample shows, we do not in general have associativity in nite domains. Moreover, this lack of associativity can result in the failure of Cox's theorem.
A similar problem seems to exist in Acz el's proof (as already observed by Paris (1994) ). While Acz el's proof does not involve showing that F is associative, it does involve showing that G is associative. Again, it is not hard to show that G is associative for appropriate triples, just as is the case for F . But it seems that Acz el also needs an assumption that guarantees that the appropriate set of triples is dense, and it is not clear that his assumptions do in fact guarantee this. 4 As shown in Section 2, the problem also arises in Reichenbach's proof.
The counterexample to Cox's theorem, with slight modi cations, can also be used to show that another well-known result in the literature is not completely correct. In his seminal book on probability and qualitative probability (1973), Fine considers a non-numeric notion of comparative (conditional) probability, which allows us to say \U given V is at least as probable as U 0 given V 0 ", denoted UjV U 0 jV 0 . Conditions on are given that are claimed to force the existence of (among other things) a function Bel such that UjV U 0 jV 0 i Bel(UjV ) Bel(U 0 jV 0 ) and an associative function F satisfying A2. (This is Theorem 8 of Chapter II in (Fine, 1973) .) However, the Bel de ned in my counterexample to Cox's theorem can be used to give a counterexample to this result as well.
Interestingly, this is not the rst time a similar error has been noted in the use of functional equations. Falmagne (1981) gives another example (in a case involving a utility model of choice behavior) and mentions that he knows \of at least two similar examples in the psychological literature".
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section there is a more detailed discussion of the problem in Cox's proof. The counterexample to Cox's theorem is given in Section 3. The following section shows that it is also a counterexample to Fine's theorem. Section 5 concludes with some discussion, particularly of assumptions under which Cox's theorem might hold.
The Problem With Cox's Proof
To understand the problems with Cox's proof, I actually consider Reichenbach's proof, which is similar in spirit Cox's proof (it is actually even closer to Acz el's proof), but uses some additional assumptions, which makes it easier to explain in detail. Acz el, Cox, and Reichenbach all make critical use of functional equations in their proof, and they make the same (seemingly unjusti ed) leap at corresponding points in their proofs.
In the notation of this paper, Reichenbach (1949, pp. 65{67) assumes (1) that the range of Bel( j ) is a subset of 0; 1], (2) Bel(V jU) = 1 if U V , (3) that if V and V 0 are disjoint, then Bel(V V 0 jU) = Bel(V jU)+Bel(V 0 jU) (thus, he assumes that A3 holds, with G being +), and (4) that A2 holds with a function F that is di erentiable. (He remarks that the result holds even without assumption (4), although the proof is more complicated; Acz el in fact does not make an assumption like (4).) Reichenbach's proof proceeds as follows: Replacing V 0 in A2 by V 1 V 2 , where V 1 and V 2 are disjoint, we get that
(2) Using the fact that G is +, we immediately get
4. I should stress that my counterexample is not a counterexample to Acz el's theorem, since he explicitly assumes that the range of Bel is in nite. However, it does point out potential problems with his proof, and certainly shows that his argument does not apply to nite domains. Acz el is in fact aware of the problems with his proof private communication, 1996] . He later proved results in a similar spirit with the aid of a requirement of nonatomicity (Acz el & Daroczy, 1975, pp. 5{6) , which is in fact a stronger requirement than A4, and thus also requires the domain to be in nite.
and
Moreover, by A2, we also have, for i = 1; 2,
Putting together (2), (3), (4), and (5), we get that
Taking x = Bel(V \ V 1 jV \ U), y = Bel(V \ V 2 jV \ U), and z = Bel(V jU) in (6), we get the functional equation F (x; z) + F (y; z) = F (x + y; z): (7) Suppose that we assume (as Reichenbach implicitly does) that this functional equation holds for all (x; y; z) 2 P = f(x; y; z) 2 0; 1] 3 : x+y 1g. The rest of the proof now follows easily. First, taking x = 0 in (7), it follows that F (0; z) + F (y; z) = F (y; z); from which we get that F (0; z) = 0: Next, x z and let g z (x) = F (x; z). Since F is, by assumption, di erentiable, from (7) we have that It thus follows that g 0 z (x) is a constant, independent of x. Since the constant may depend on z, there is some function h such that g 0 z (x) = h(z). Using the fact that F (0; z) = 0, elementary calculus tells us that
Using the assumption that for all U; V , we have Bel(V jU) = 1 if U V , we get that
Thus, we have that F (1; z) = h(z) = z: We conclude that F (x; z) = xz.
Note, however, that this conclusion depends in a crucial way on the assumption that the functional equation (7) holds for all (x; y; z) 2 P . 5 In fact, all that we can conclude from (6) is that it holds for all (x; y; z) such that there exist U, V , V 1 , and V 2 , with V 1 and V 2 disjoint, such that x = Bel(V \ V 1 jV \ U), y = Bel(V \ V 2 jV \ U), and z = Bel(V jU).
5. Actually, using the continuity of F , it su ces that the functional equation holds for a set of triples which is dense in P .
Let us say that a triple that satis es this condition is R-constrained (since it must satisfy certain constraints imposed by the F and G functions; the R here is for Reichenbach, to distinguish this notion from a similar one de ned in the next section.) As I mentioned earlier, Acz el also assumes that Bel(V jU) takes on all values in e; E], where e = Bel(;jU) and E = Bel(UjU). (In Reichenbach's formulation, e = 0 and E = 1.) There are two ways to interpret this assumption. The weak interpretation is that for each x 2 0; 1], there exist U; V such that Bel(V jU) = x. The strong interpretation is that for each U and x, there exists V such that Bel(V jU) = x. It is not clear which interpretation is intended by Acz el.
Neither one obviously su ces to prove that every triple in P is R-constrained, although it does seem plausible that it might follow from the second assumption.
In any case, neither Acz el nor Reichenbach see a need to check that Equation (7) holds throughout P . (Nor does Cox for his analogous functional equation, nor do the authors of more recent and polished presentations of Cox's result, such as Jaynes (1996) and Tribus (1969) .) However, it turns out to be quite necessary to do this. Moreover, it is clear that if W is nite, there are only nitely tuples in P that are R-constrained, and it is not the case that all of P is. As we shall see in the next section, this observation has serious consequences as far as all these proofs are concerned.
The Counterexample to Cox's Theorem
The goal of this section is to prove Theorem 3.1: There is a function Bel 0 , a nite domain W , and functions S, F , and G satisfying A1, A2, and A3 respectively such that Bel 0 (V jU) 2 0; 1] for U 6 = ;, S(x) = 1 x (so that S is strictly decreasing and in nitely di erentiable), G(x; y) = x + y (so that G is strictly increasing in each argument and is in nitely di erentiable), F is in nitely di erentiable, nondecreasing in each argument in 0; 1] 2 , and strictly increasing in each argument in (0; 1] 2 . Moreover, F is commutative, F (x; 0) = F (0; x) = 0, and F (x; 1) = F (1; x) = x.
However, there is no one-to-one onto function g : 0; 1] ! 0; 1] satisfying (1).
Note that the hypotheses on Bel 0 , S, G, and F are at least as strong as those made in all the other variants of Cox's result, while the assumptions on g are weaker than those made in the variants. For example, there is no requirement that g be continuous or increasing nor that g Bel 0 is a probability distribution (although Paris and Acz el both prove that, under their assumptions, g can be taken to satisfy all these requirements). This serves to make the counterexample quite strong.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is constructive. Consider a domain W with 12 points: w 1 ; :::; w 12 . We associate with each point w 2 W a weight f(w), as follows.
f(w 1 ) = 3 f(w 4 ) = 5 10 4 f(w 2 ) = 2 f(w 5 ) = 6 10 4 f(w 3 ) = 6 f(w 6 ) = 8 10 4
f(w 7 ) = 3 10 8 f(w 10 ) = 3 10 18 f(w 8 ) = 8 10 8 f(w 11 ) = 2 10 18 f(w 9 ) = 8 10 8 f(w 12 ) = 14 10 18 For a subset U of W , we de ne f(U) = P w2U f(w). Thus, we can de ne a probability distribution Pr on W by taking Pr(U) = f(U)=f(W ).
Let f 0 be identical to f, except that f 0 (w 10 ) = (3 ) 10 18 and f 0 (w 11 ) = (2 + ) 10 18 , where is de ned below. Again, we extend f 0 to subsets of W by de ning f 0 (U) = P w2U f 0 (w). Let W 0 = fw 10 ; w 11 ; w 12 g. If U 6 = ;, de ne
Bel 0 is clearly very close to Pr. If U 6 = ;, then it is easy to see that jBel 0 (V jU) Pr 
Since the range of Pr is nite, all su ciently small satisfy (8).
The exact choice of weights above is not particularly important. One thing that is important though is the following collection of equalities:
Pr(w 1 jfw 1 ; w 2 g) = Pr(w 10 jfw 10 ; w 11 g) = 3=5 Pr(fw 1 ; w 2 gjfw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g) = Pr(w 4 jfw 4 ; w 5 g) = 5=11 Pr(fw 4 ; w 5 gjfw 4 ; w 5 ; w 6 g) = Pr(fw 7 ; w 8 gjfw 7 ; w 8 ; w 9 g) = 11=19 Pr(w 4 jfw 4 ; w 5 ; w 6 g) = Pr(fw 10 ; w 11 gjfw 10 ; w 11 ; w 12 g) = 5=19 Pr(w 1 jfw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g) = Pr(w 7 jfw 7 ; w 8 g) = 3=11:
It is easy to check that exactly the same equalities hold if we replace Pr by Bel 0 .
We show that Bel 0 satis es the requirements of Theorem 3.1 by a sequence of lemmas. The rst lemma is the key to showing that Bel 0 cannot be isomorphic to a probability function. It uses the fact (proved in Lemma 3.3) that if Bel 0 were isomorphic to a probability function, then there would have to be a function F satisfying A2 that is associative. Although, as is shown in Lemma 3.7, the function F satisfying A2 can be taken to be in nitely di erentiable and increasing in each argument, the equalities in (9) su ce to guarantee that it cannot be taken to be associative, that is, we do not in general have F (x; F (y; z)) = F (F (x; y); z): Indeed, there is no associative function F satisfying A2, even if we drop the requirements that F be di erentiable or increasing. Lemma 3.2: For Bel 0 as de ned above, there is no associative function F satisfying A2. Proof: Suppose there were such a function F . From (9), we must have that F (5=11; 11=19) = F (Bel 0 (w 4 jfw 4 ; w 5 g); Bel 0 (fw 4 ; w 5 gjfw 4 ; w 5 ; w 6 g)) = Bel 0 (w 4 jfw 4 ; w 5 ; w 6 g) = 5=19
and that F (3=5; 5=11) = F (Bel 0 (w 1 jfw 1 ; w 2 g); Bel 0 (fw 1 ; w 2 gjfw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g)) = Bel 0 (w 1 jfw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g) = 3=11:
It follows that F (3=5; F (5=11; 11=19)) = F (3=5; 5=19) and that F (F (3=5; 5=11); 11=19) = F (3=11; 11=19): Thus, if F were associative, we would have F (3=5; 5=19) = F (3=11; 11=19): On the other hand, from (9) again, we see that F (3=5; 5=19) = F (Bel 0 (w 10 jfw 10 ; w 11 g); Bel 0 (fw 10 ; w 11 gjfw 10 ; w 11 ; w 12 g)) = Bel 0 (w 10 jfw 10 ; w 11 ; w 12 g) = (3 )=19; while F (3=11; 11=19) = F (Bel 0 (w 7 jfw 7 ; w 8 g); Bel 0 (fw 7 ; w 8 gjfw 7 ; w 8 ; w 9 g)) = Bel 0 (w 7 jfw 7 ; w 8 ; w 9 g) = 3=19: It follows that F cannot be associative. u t To understand how Lemma 3.2 relates to our discussion in Section 2 of the problems with Reichenbach's proof, we say (x; y; z) is a constrained triple if there exist sets U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4 with U 3 6 = ; such that x = Bel 0 (U 4 jU 3 ), y = Bel 0 (U 3 jU 2 ), and z = Bel 0 (U 2 jU 1 ).
It is easy to see that A2 forces F to be associative on constrained triples, since if w = Bel 0 (U 3 jU 1 ) and w 0 = Bel 0 (U 4 jU 2 ), by A2, we have F (x; F (y; z)) = F (x; w) = Bel 0 (U 4 jU 1 ) and F (F (x; y); z) = F (w 0 ; z) = Bel 0 (U 4 ; U 1 ). A4 says that the set of constrained triples is dense in 0; 1] 3 .
We similarly de ne (x; y) to be a constrained pair if there exist sets U 1 U 2 U 3 with U 2 6 = ; such that x = Bel 0 (U 3 jU 2 ) and y = Bel 0 (U 2 jU 1 ). We say that (U 1 ; U 2 ; U 3 ) corresponds to the constrained pair (x; y). (Note that there may be more than one triple of sets corresponding to a constrained pair.) If (U 1 ; U 2 ; U 3 ) corresponds to the constrained pair (x; y) and F satis es A2, then we must have F (x; y) = Bel 0 (U 3 jU 1 ). Note that both (3=5; 5=11) and (5=11; 11=19) are constrained pairs, although the triple (3=5; 5=11; 11=19) is not constrained. It is this fact that we use in Lemma 3.2. The next lemma shows that Bel 0 cannot be isomorphic to a probability function. 
Now de ne F (x; y) = g 1 (g(x) g(y)). We show that F de ned in this way satis es A2 and is associative. This will give us a contradiction to Lemma 3.2.
To see that F satis es A2, notice that, by applying the observation above repeatedly, if V \ U 6 = ;, we get
Thus, F satis es A2.
To see that F is associative, note that
This gives us the desired contradiction to Lemma 3.2. It follows that Bel 0 cannot be isomorphic to a probability function. u t Despite the fact that Bel 0 is not isomorphic to a probability function, functions S, F , and G can be de ned that satisfy A1, A2, and A3, respectively, and all the other requirements stated in Theorem 3.1. The argument for S and G is easy; all the work goes into proving that an appropriate F exists.
Lemma 3.4 : There exists an in nitely di erentiable, strictly decreasing function S : 0; 1] ! 0; 1] such that Bel 0 (V jU) = S(Bel 0 (V jU)) for all sets U; V W with U 6 = ;.
In fact, we can take S(x) = 1 x.
Proof: This is immediate from the observation that Bel 0 (V jU) = 1 Bel 0 (V jU) for U; V W . u t (8), it follows that Pr(V 3 jV 2 \V 1 ) Pr(U 3 jU 2 \U 1 ) and Pr(V 2 jV 1 ) Pr(U 2 jU 1 ). If we have either Pr(V 3 jV 2 \V 1 ) < Pr(U 3 jU 2 \U 1 ) or Pr(V 2 jV 1 ) < Pr(U 2 jU 1 ), then we have either Pr(V 3 \ V 2 jV 1 ) < Pr(U 3 \ U 2 jU 1 ) or Pr(U 3 jU 2 \ U 1 ) = 0 or Pr(U 2 jU 1 ) = 0. It follows that either Bel 0 (V 3 \ V 2 jV 1 ) < Bel 0 (U 3 \ U 2 jU 1 ) (this uses (8) again) or that Bel 0 (V 3 \ V 2 jV 1 ) = Bel 0 (U 3 \ U 2 jU 1 ) = 0. In either case, the lemma holds.
Thus, it remains to deal with the case that Pr(V 3 jV 2 \ V 1 ) = Pr(U 3 jU 2 \ U 1 ) and Pr(V 2 jV 1 ) = Pr(U 2 jU 1 ), and hence Pr(V 3 \ V 2 jV 1 ) = Pr(U 3 \ U 2 jU 1 ). The details of this analysis are left to the appendix. u t pairs. For a constrained pair, we de ne F 0 in the unique way required to satisfy A2. A priori, F 0 may not be well de ned; it is possible that there exist triples (U 1 ; U 2 ; U 3 ) and (V 1 ; V 2 ; V 3 ) that both correspond to (x; y) (i.e., x = Bel 0 (U 3 jU 2 ) = Bel 0 (V 3 jV 2 ) and y = Bel 0 (U 2 jU 1 ) = Bel 0 (V 2 jV 1 )) such that Bel 0 (U 3 jU 1 ) 6 = Bel 0 (V 3 jV 1 ). If this were the case, then F 0 (x; y) would not be well de ned. However, Lemma 3.6 says that this cannot happen. Moreover, Lemma 3.6 assures us that F 0 is increasing on D, and strictly increasing as long as one of its arguments is not 0. Indeed, if there is a triple (U 1 ; U 2 ; U 3 ) corresponding to (x; y) such that fw 10 ; w 11 ; w 12 g 6 U 1 , then we must have F 0 (x; y) = xy.
The domain D of F 0 is nite. Let D 0 be the commutative closure of D, so that D 0 consists of D and all pairs (y; x) such that (x; y) is in D. Extend F 0 to a commutative function F 00 on D 0 by de ning F 00 (y; x) = F 0 (x; y) if (x; y) 2 D. F 00 is well de ned because, as can easily be veri ed, if (x; y) and (y; x) are both in D, one of x or y must be 1, and F 0 (x; 1) = F 0 (1; x) = x. Clearly F 00 is commutative. It is also increasing. For suppose (x; y); (x 0 ; y 0 ) 2 D 0 , x x 0 , and y y 0 . If both (x; y) and (x 0 ; y 0 ) are in D, we must have F 00 (x; y) F 00 (x 0 ; y 0 ), since F 0 is increasing. Similarly, if both (y; x) and (y 0 ; x 0 ) are in D, we must have F 00 (x; y) = F 0 (y; x) F 0 (y 0 ; x 0 ) = F 00 (x 0 ; y 0 ). Finally, if (x; y) and (y 0 ; x 0 ) are in D, a straightforward check over all possible elements in D shows that this can happen only if the triples (U 1 ; U 2 ; U 3 ) and (V 1 ; V 2 ; V 3 ) corresponding to (x; y) and (y 0 ; x 0 ) are such that fw 10 ; w 11 ; w 12 g is not a subset of either U 1 or V 1 . It follows that F 0 (x; y) = xy and F 0 (y 0 ; x 0 ) = x 0 y 0 , so again we get that F 00 is increasing. A similar argument shows that F 00 is strictly increasing as long as one of its arguments is not 0.
It is straightforward to extend F 00 to a commutative, in nitely di erentiable, and increasing function F de ned on all of 0; 1] 2 , which is strictly increasing on (0; 1] 2 , and satis es F (x; 1) = F (1; x) = x and F (x; 0) = F (0; x) = 0. We proceed as follows. We rst extend F 00 so that it is de ned for all pairs (x; y) 2 0; 1] 2 such that x y so that it has the required properties. If x < y, we then de ne so that F (x; y) = F (y; x). Since F 00 is commutative, this de nition agrees with F 00 (x; y) for x < y. Clearly F is commutative and in nitely di erentiable. To see that F is increasing, suppose that x x 0 and y y 0 . Just as in the case of F 00 , it is immediate that F is increasing if both x y and x 0 y 0 or both x < y and x 0 < y 0 . Otherwise, suppose x y and y 0 x 0 . Then we have y x x 0 y 0 . Since F is increasing on f(x; y) : x yg, we have F (x; y) F (x 0 ; y) F (x 0 ; x 0 ) F (y 0 ; x 0 ) = F (x 0 ; y 0 ).
A similar argument shows that F is strictly increasing unless one its arguments is 0. Finally, F clearly satis es A2, since (by construction) F 0 does, and A2 puts constraints only on the domain of F 0 . u t Theorem 3.1 now follows from Lemmas 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7.
The Counterexample to Fine's Theorem
Fine is interested in what he calls comparative conditional probability. Thus, rather than associating a real number with each \conditional object" V jU, he puts an ordering on such objects. As usual, V jU V 0 jU 0 is taken to be an abbreviation for V jU V 0 jU 0 and not(V 0 jU 0 V jU).
Fine is interested in when such an ordering is induced by a real-valued belief function with reasonable properties. He says that a real-valued function P on such objects agrees with if P (V jU) P (V 0 jU 0 ) i V jU V 0 jU 0 . Fine then considers a number of axioms that might satisfy. For our purposes, the most relevant are the ones Fine denotes QCC1, QCC2, QCC5, and QCC7.
QCC1 just says that is a linear order:
QCC1. V jU V 0 jU 0 or V 0 jU 0 V jU.
QCC2 says that is transitive:
QCC2. If V 1 jU 1 V 2 jU 2 and V 2 jU 2 V 3 jU 3 , then V 1 jU 1 V 3 jU 3 .
QCC5 is a technical condition involving notions of order topology. The relevant de nitions are omitted here (see (Fine, 1973) Fine's Theorem: (Fine, 1973, Chapter II, Theorem 8) If satis es QCC1, QCC2, QCC5, then there exists some agreeing function P . There exists a function F of two variables such that
2. F (x; y) = F (y; x), 3. F (x; y) is increasing in x for y > P (;jW ), 4. F (x; F (y; z)) = F (F (x; y); z), 5. F (P (W jU); y) = y, 6. F (P (;jU); y) = P (;jU). i also satis es QCC7. The only relevant clauses for our purposes are Clause (1), which is just A2, and Clause (4), which says that F is associative. As Lemma 3.2 shows, there is no associative function satisfying A2 for Bel 0 . As I now show, this means that Fine's theorem does not quite hold either.
Before doing so, let me brie y touch on a subtle issue regarding the domain of . In the counterexample of the previous section, Bel 0 (V jU) is de ned as long as U 6 = ;. Fine does not assume that the relation is necessarily de ned on all objects V jU such that U; V W and U 6 = ;. He assumes that there is an algebra F of subsets of W (that is, a set of subsets closed under nite intersections and complementation) and a subset F 0 of F closed under nite intersections and not containing the empty set such that is de ned on conditional objects V jU such that V 2 F and U 2 F 0 . Since F 0 is closed under intersection and does not contain the empty set, F 0 cannot contain disjoint sets. If W is nite, then the only way a collection F 0 can meet Fine's restriction is if there is some nonempty set U 0 such that all elements in F 0 contain U 0 . This restriction is clearly too strong to the extent that comparative conditional probability is intended to generalize probability. If Pr is a probability function, then it certainly makes sense to compare Pr(V jU) and Pr(V 0 jU 0 ) even 6. Fine assumes that P (V \ V 0 jU ) = F (P (V jU ); P (V 0 jV \ U )). I have reordered the arguments here for consistency with Cox's theorem. if U and U 0 are disjoint sets. Fine private communication, 1995] suggested that it might be better to constrain QCC7 so that we do not condition on events U that are equivalent to ; (where U is equivalent to ; if ; U and U ;). Since the only event equivalent to ; in the counterexample of the previous section is ; itself, this means that the counterexample can be used without change. This is what is done in the proof below. I show below how to modify the counterexample so that it satis es Fine's original restrictions.
Theorem 4.1: There exists an ordering satisfying QCC1, QCC2, QCC5, and QCC7, such that for every function P agreeing with , there is no associative function F of two variables such that P (V \ V 0 )jU) = F (P (V 0 jV \ U); P (V jU)).
Proof: Let W and Bel 0 be as in the counterexample in the previous section. De ne so that Bel 0 agrees with . Thus, V jU V 0 jU 0 i Bel 0 (V jU) Bel 0 (V 0 jU 0 ). Clearly satis es QCC1 and QCC2. As was mentioned earlier, since W is nite, vacuously satis es QCC5. Lemma 3.6 shows that satis es parts (a) and (c) of QCC7. To show that also satis es part (b) of QCC7, we must prove that if Bel 0 (V 3 jV 2 \V 1 ) Bel 0 (U 2 jU 1 ) and Bel 0 (V 2 jV 1 ) Bel 0 (U 3 jU 2 \ U 1 ), then Bel 0 (V 3 \ V 2 jV 1 ) Bel 0 (U 3 \ U 2 jU 1 ). The proof of this is almost identical to that of Lemma 3.6; we simply exchange the roles of Pr(V 2 jV 1 ) and Pr(V 3 jV 2 \V 1 ) in that proof. I leave the details to the reader. Lemma 3.2 shows that there is no associative function F satisfying A2 for Bel 0 . All that was used in the proof was the fact that Bel 0 satis ed the inequalities of (9). But these equalities must hold for any function agreeing with . Thus, exactly the same proof shows that if P is any function agreeing with , then there is no associative function F satisfying P (V \V 0 jU) = F (P (V 0 jV \U); P (V jU)). u t I conclude this section by brie y sketching how the counterexample can be modi ed so that it satis es Fine's original restriction. Rede ne W by adding one more element w 0 . Rede ne f and f 0 so that f(w 0 ) = f 0 (w 0 ) = 10 5 ; in addition, rede ne f and f 0 on w 3 , w 6 , w 9 , and w 12 , so as to decrease their weight by 10 5 , the weight of w 0 . Thus, f(w 3 ) = f 0 (w 3 ) = 6 10 5 , f(w 6 ) = f 0 (w 6 ) = 8 10 4 10 5 , f(w 9 ) = f 0 (w 9 ) = 8 10 8 10 5 , and f(w 12 ) = f 0 (w 12 ) = 14 10 18 10 5 .
Finally, rede ne W 0 to be fw 0 ; w 10 ; w 11 ; w 12 g. The de nition of Bel 0 in terms of f, f 0 , and W 0 remains the same. With these rede nitions, the proofs of the previous section go through essentially unchanged. In particular, the equalities in (9) now hold if we add w 0 to every set.
Let F 0 consist of all subsets of W containing w 0 . Notice that F 0 is closed under intersection and does not contain the empty set. The lack of associativity in Lemma 3.2 can now be demonstrated by conditioning on sets in F 0 . As a consequence, we get a counterexample to Fine's theorem even when restricting to conditional objects that satisfy his restriction.
Discussion
Let me summarize the status of various results in the light of the counterexample of this paper:
Cox's theorem as originally stated does not hold in nite domains. Moreover, even in in nite domains, the counterexample and the discussion in Section 2 suggest that more assumptions are required for its correctness. In particular, the claim in his proof that F is associative does not follow.
Although the counterexample given here is not a counterexample to Acz el's theorem, his assumptions do not seem strong enough to guarantee that the function G is associative, as he claims it is.
The variants of Cox's theorem stated by Heckerman (1988) , Horvitz, Heckerman, and Langlotz (1986) , and Aleliunas (1988) all succumb to the counterexample.
The claim that the function F must be associative in Fine's theorem is incorrect. Fine has an analogous result (Fine, 1973, Chapter II, Theorem 4) for unconditional comparative probability involving a function G as in Acz el's theorem. This function too is claimed to be associative, and again, this does not seem to follow (although my counterexample does not apply to that theorem).
Of course, the interesting question now is what it would take to recover Cox's theorem. Paris's assumption A4 su ces, as does the stronger assumption of nonatomicity (see Footnote 4). As we have observed, A4 forces the domain of Bel to be in nite, as does the assumption that the range of Bel is all of 0; 1]. We can always extend a domain to an in nite|indeed, uncountable|domain by assuming that we have an in nite collection of independent fair coins, and that we can talk about outcomes of coin tosses as well as the original events in the domain. (This type of \extendibility" assumption is fairly standard; for example, it is made by Savage (1954) in quite a di erent context.) In such an extended domain, it seems reasonable to also assume that Bel varies uniformly between 0 (certain falsehood) and 1 (certain truth). If we also assume A4 (or something like it), we can then recover Cox's theorem. Notice, however, that this viewpoint disallows a notion of belief that takes on only nitely many gradations.
Another possibility is to observe that we are not interested in just one domain in isolation. Rather, what we are interested in is a notion of belief Bel that applies uniformly to all domains. Thus, even if (U; V ) and (U 0 ; V 0 ) are pairs of subsets of di erent (perhaps even disjoint) domains, if Bel(V jU) and Bel(V 0 jU 0 ) are both 1=2, then we would expect this to denote the same relative strength of belief. In this setting, an analogue of A4 seems more reasonable. That is, we can assume that for all 0 ; ; 1 and > 0, there is some domain W and subsets U 1 , U 2 , U 3 , and U 4 of W such that the conclusion of A4 holds. If we further assume that the functions F , G, and S are also uniform across domains (that is, that A1, A2, and A3 hold for the same choice of F , G, and S in every domain), then we can again recover Cox's theorem. 7 7. This point was independently observed by Je Paris private communication, 1996] .
The idea of having a notion of uncertainty that applies uniformly in all domains seems implicit in some discussion in that Jaynes' recent book on probability theory (1996) . Jaynes focuses almost exclusively on nite domains. 8 As he says \In principle, every problem must start with such nite set probabilities; extensions to in nite sets is permitted only when this is the result of a well-de ned and well-behaved limiting process from a nite set." To make sense of this limiting process, it seems that Jaynes must be assuming that the same notion of uncertainty applies in all domains. Moreover, one can make arguments appealing to continuity that when we consider such limiting processes, we can always nd subsets U 1 , U 2 , U 3 , and U 4 in some su ciently rich (but nite) extension of the original domain such that A4 holds.
While this seems like perhaps the most reasonable additional assumptions required to get Cox's result, it does require us to consider many domains at once. Moreover, it does not allow a notion of belief that has only nitely many gradations, let alone a notion of belief that allows some events to be considered incomparable in likelihood. 9 Suppose we really are interested in one particular nite domain, and we do not want to extend it or consider all other possible domains. What assumptions do we then need to get Cox's theorem? The counterexample given here could be circumvented by requiring that F be associative on all tuples (rather than just on the constrained triples). However, if we really are interested in a single domain, the motivation for making requirements on the behavior of F on belief values that do not arise is not so clear. Moreover, it is far from clear that assuming that F is associative su ces to prove the theorem. For example, Cox's proof makes use of various functional equations involving F and S, analogous to the equation (7) that appears in Section 2. These functional equations are easily seen to hold for certain tuples. However, as we saw in Section 2, the proof really requires that they hold for all tuples. Just assuming that F is associative does not appear to su ce to guarantee that the functional equations involving S hold for all tuples. Further assumptions appear necessary.
Nir Friedman private communication] has conjectured that the following condition, which says that essentially all beliefs are distinct, su ces: if ; U V , ; U 0 V 0 , and (U; V ) 6 = (U 0 ; V 0 ), then Bel(UjV ) 6 = Bel(U 0 jV 0 ).
Even if this condition su ces, note that it precludes, for example, a uniform probability distribution, and thus again seems unduly restrictive.
Another possibly interesting line of research is that of characterizing the functions that satisfy Cox's assumptions. As the example given here shows, the class of such functions includes functions that are not isomorphic to any probability function. I conjecture that in fact it includes only functions that are in some sense \close" to a function isomorphic to a probability distribution, although it is not clear exactly how \close" should be de ned (nor how interesting this class really is in practice).
So what does all this say regarding the use of probability? Not much. Although I have tried to argue here that Cox's justi cation of probability is not quite as strong as 8. Actually, Jaynes assigns probability to propositions, not sets, but, as noted earlier, there is essentially no di erence between the two. 9. Interestingly, Jaynes (1996, Appendix A) admits that having plausibility values be elements of a partiallyordered lattice may be a reasonable alternative to traditional probability theory. Nir Friedman and I (1995 Friedman and I ( , 1996 Friedman and I ( , 1997 have recently developed such a theory and shown that it provides a useful basis for thinking about default reasoning and belief revision.
previously believed, and the assumptions underlying the variants of it need clari cation, I am not trying to suggest that probability should be abandoned. There are many other justi cations for its use.
f(V 1 \V 2 \V 3 ). Moreover, it is easy to see that all these equalities must hold if f is replaced by f 0 . Again, the lemma immediately follows. To prove the claim, for de niteness, assume that (U 1 ; U 2 ; U 3 ) is not good (an identical argument works if (V 1 ; V 2 ; V 3 ) is not good). From the characterization above of triples that are not good, it follows that f(U 1 \ U 2 ) = a 10 18 + b and f(U 1 ) = 19 10 18 + c, where a 2 f2; 3; 16; 17g (depending on U 2 \fw 10 ; w 11 ; w 12 g), and both b; c < 20 10 8 . Clearly, the relevant number closest to Pr(U 2 jU 1 ) is a=19. Since Pr(V 2 jV 1 ) = Pr(U 2 jU 1 ) by assumption, Pr(V 2 jV 1 ) is also close to a=19. Thus, we must have that f(V 1 \ V 2 ) = a 10 k + b 0 and f(V 1 ) = 19 10 k +c 0 , where k 2 f0; 4; 8; 18g. In fact, it is easy to see that k is either 8 or 18, since there are no relevant numbers of the form a=19 (for a 2 f2; 3; 16; 17g) that are close to Pr(V jU) if U fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ; w 5 ; w 6 g. Thus, it follows that Pr(U 2 jU 1 ) = Pr(V 2 jV 1 ) = a=19. Moreover, we must have V 1 = fw 7 ; w 8 ; w 9 g and V 2 \V 1 either fw 7 g or fw 8 ; w 9 g, depending on a. It follows that Pr(V 3 jV 2 \ V 1 ) must be one of f0; 1=2; 1g. Since Pr(U 3 jU 2 \ U 1 ) = Pr(V 3 jV 2 \ V 1 ), we must have that Pr(U 3 jU 2 \U 1 ) 2 f0; 1=2; 1g. Since U 2 \U 1 contains exactly one of w 10 and w 11 , it is easy to see that Pr(U 3 jU 2 \U 1 ) cannot be 1=2. If Pr(U 3 jU 2 \U 1 ) = Pr(V 3 jV 2 \V 1 ) = 0, then U 3 \U 2 \U 1 = V 3 \V 2 \V 1 = ;, and we must have Bel 0 (U 3 \U 2 jU 1 ) = Bel 0 (V 3 \V 2 jV 1 ) = 0, so the claim follows. On the other hand, if Pr(U 3 jU 2 \ U 1 ) = Pr(V 3 jV 2 \ V 1 ) = 1, then U 3 \ U 2 \ U 1 = U 2 \ U 1 and V 3 \ V 2 \ V 1 = V 2 \ V 1 , and the claim again follows. As we have seen, this su ces to prove the claim. Thus, we can assume that b = c = 0. But this means that U 1 = fw 10 ; w 11 ; w 12 g, and that U 1 \ U 2 is either fw 10 g or fw 11 ; w 12 g. It follows that the only possibilities for Pr(U 3 jU 2 \ U 1 ) are 0, 1=8, 7=8, or 1. It is easy to see that Pr(V 3 jV 2 \ V 1 ) cannot be 1=8 or 7=8, while the cases where it is either 0 or 1 are easily taken care of, as above.
This completes the proof of the claim and of the lemma. u t
